Contractual Protection: An Existing Remedy for Bondholder Distress by Stagg, Thomas E. & Ferretti, Scott
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 4 
Issue 2 Volume 4, 1989, Issue 2 Article 4 
March 1989 
Contractual Protection: An Existing Remedy for Bondholder 
Distress 
Thomas E. Stagg 
Scott Ferretti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Stagg, Thomas E. and Ferretti, Scott (1989) "Contractual Protection: An Existing Remedy for Bondholder 
Distress," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol4/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 





The interests of bondholders' have traditionally conflicted with
the interests of stockholders.2 Recently, as companies have be-
' See Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667,
667 n.2. Literature has classified bonds and debentures under the generic name of bonds.
Id. A "bond" typically refers to a "long term promissory note issued pursuant to a trust
indenture" and secured by a lien on some or all of the issuer's property. Id. A "debenture"
is a "long term promissory note issued pursuant to a trust indenture" and is usually not
secured by a mortgage or lien upon any specific property. Id. Debentures generally involve
only the personal obligation of the obligor. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORA-
TIONS 388 (1983). See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 1-2
(1971) 1 hereinafter COMMENTARIES]. For a discussion of trust indentures, see infra notes 20-
28 and accompanying text.
' See Bratton, supra note 1, at 667-68 & n. 1. Because bondholders and stockholders have
distinct interests in the corporate enterprise, their relationship is often characterized as
adverse. Id. 'rhe phrase "conflicting interests" describes the conflict that exists between
"the self interest of an individual or legal entity and its legal or moral obligations to
others." Id. See also N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1989, at 39, col. 2 ("It is widely recognized that the
fiduciary obligation of a corporate director to enhance shareholder value may often con-
flict with the interests of bondholders."); Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness
and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 738 & n.l (1978) (explains reasons for con-
flict of interests in market transactions).
The bondholder is often referred to as a creditor of the issuing corporation, while the
stockholder is viewed as the debtor. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note i, at 380,
383. See also Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827 and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov.
21, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (debentureholders, in contrast to stockholders,
are creditors of the corporation). Due to this debtor-creditor relationship, bondholders and
stockholders have an adverse interest "with respect to the manner in which the enterprise
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come more heavily debt-laden,3 this conflict has become increas-
ingly pronounced in the face of what some economists describe as
an unprecedented transfer of wealth from bondholders to stock-
holders." Today's most notable example of wealth transfer is the
leveraged buyout (LBO), in which corporate management or
other investors take on new debt to buy out stockholders at a pre-
mium above the market value of their shares.5 In an LBO, the
outstanding bonds are devalued due to the increased risk that the
issuing corporation will not be able to meet its additional interest
obligations.'
Dissatisfaction over wealth transfer has led one group of bond-
holders to file suit against RJR Nabisco (RJR) in New York federal
district court.' The bondholder plaintiffs, Metropolitan Life In-
is managed." Comment, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial
Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 461, 462 (1988). For a discus-
sion of stockholder-bondholder conflict, see infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
' See McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 414 (1986)
(quoting Bleakley, Business Bets on Bonds Again, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 5).
A recent study of debt-to-equity ratios of nonfinancial corporations showed that at the end
of the first quarter of 1985, debt ratios rose to 6.2-to-1, from less than 4-to-I one year
earlier. Id.
See McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. LAW 205, 225 (1988) (econo-
mists analyzing stockholder-bondholder conflict refer to wealth transfers from bondholders
to stockholders as expropriation or "ripoff"); Barkey, The Financial Articulation of a Fiduci-
ary Duty to Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHrON
L. REV. 47, 56 (1986) (placing corporate assets and cash flow in hands of stockholders cre-
ates tendency for "unanticipated wealth expropriations" from bondholder to stockholder).
The leveraged buyout produces a wealth transfer from existing bondholders to stock-
holders when the bond market adversely reacts to additional debt obligation incurred by
the issuing corporation. A Bruising Battle Over Bonds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, § 3, at 1,
col. 2 (studies show bondholder loses four percent of holdings in highly leveraged buyouts).
See Recapitalizations Are a Bonanza for Some, But Bondholders Can Take a Terrific Beating, Wall
St.J.,June 1, 1987, at 53, col. 3 ("Regardless of what recapitalizations do for stockholders,
they're almost never good for bondholders").
' N.Y. Times, supra note 4, § 3, at 21. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., No. 88-8266 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). "A lever-
aged buy-out occurs when a group of investors, usually including members of a company's
management team, buy the company under financial arrangements that include little equity
and significant new debt." Id. See also Farrell, Takeovers and Buyouts Clobber Blue-Chip Bond-
holders, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, 113, 113 (stock owners benefit from stock buybacks, ac-
quisitions, and leveraged buyouts, but debt holders suffer).
6 N.Y. Times, supra note 4, § 3, at 21. See McDaniel, supra note 3, at 419 (sharing equity
cushion with new bondholders increases risk to old bondholders causing price of outstand-
ing bonds to decline); Farrell, Bondholders Are Mad As Hell - And They're Not Going To Take
It Anymore, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, 82, 82 ("The prospect that [a] company will have to
take on more debt sends its bond prices plummeting.").
' Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 88-8266 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989)
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surance Company and Jefferson Pilot Life Insurance Company,
charged that RJR's management initiated a leveraged buyout that
violated the fiduciary and good faith obligations RJR owed to its
existing bondholders.8 Metropolitan claimed that it alone lost $40
million on its RJR bond portfolio as a result of RJR's proposed
LBO and the subsequent bond fallout.9
The facts in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. reveal
that from January through April, 1988, the investment banking
firm of Shearson Lehman Hutton sold $1 billion of RJR Nabisco
bonds.' 0 In October, 1988, Shearson then helped RJR's Chair-
man, F. Ross Johnson, plan a leveraged buyout of the company,
which drove the market value of the bonds down by more than
$100 million." Bonds with a par value of $100, which were trad-
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (discussion of summary judgment motions, infra note 19).
Metropolitan asserted that the proposed buy-out would transfer the value of the "invest-
ment grade quality of the debt . . . to the 'buy-out' proponents and to the shareholders."
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 14, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (No. 88-8266). See also
N.Y. Times, supra note 4, § 3, at 1; Farrell, supra note 6, at 82.
8 Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 13-14, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (No. 88-8266).
RJR "breacheldi the duty of good faith and fair dealing by ... destroying the investment
grade quality of the debt . . . " Id. Plaintiffs also asserted claims of "unjust enrichment,
frustration of purpose, an alleged breach of something approaching a fiduciary duty, [and]
a general claim of unconscionability." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No.
88-8266 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). See Farrell, supra note
6, at 82 ("RJR's management violated its fiduciary responsibility to existing bondholders by
initiating an LBO.").
' Farrell, supra note 6, at 83. Metropolitan has stated that it owns over $340 million in
RJR Nabisco notes and debentures. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 4, Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., (No. 88-8266). Between January, 1987 and July, 1988, Metropolitan pur-
chased over $130 million of RJR debentures. Id. at 5.
" Sloan, The Rape of the Bondholder, FORBES, Jan. 23, 1989, 67, 67. In 1988, RJR Nabisco
"issued $1.4 billion in blue chip debt." Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 9, Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., (No. 88-8266). Metropolitan asserted that as early as September, 1987,
RJR management was exploring the possibility of a leveraged buy-out. Id. at 8. Yet, despite
the effect that a buy-out would have on the company, "RJR Nabisco continued to issue its
investment grade debt securities." Id. at 9. RJR's "long term bonds were issued in a market
environment in which 'leveraged buy-outs' of $25 billion were not expected." Id. at 6-7.
"RJR Nabisco's investment grade rating did not reflect the possibility that management of
one of America's leading companies would, in order to amass personal fortunes, put the
Company's future at risk and strip the Company of substantially all the value of its assets in
a 'leveraged buy-out' . . .. Id. at 7.
" Sloan, supra note 10, at 67. On October 20, 1988, F. Ross Johnson "proposed a $17
billion leveraged buy-out . . . of the company's shareholders, at $75 per share." Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 88-8266 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file). "Within a few days, a bidding war developed among the invest-
ment group led by Johnson and the investment firm of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.
("KKR"), and others." Id. RJR directors "recommended that the company accept the KKR
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ing at $85, fell to $71 upon news of the proposed buyout."
Stocks, however, fared better. While bond prices plummeted,
stock prices climbed as high as $89, from $55.1"
Metropolitan is not the first case in which bondholders have al-
leged a violation of a fiduciary duty arising from a corporate pol-
icy obligation. Nor is this the first time that bondholders have
asserted a duty of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of con-
tractual right.16 However, Metropolitan is significant because it rep-
resents a compelling challenge to traditional bondholder doctrine
at a time when bondholder dissatisfaction is acute. 6 This case is
timely because recent losses registered by bondholders have
prompted many courts and scholars to reexamine the traditional
contractual protection found in the bond agreement,' 7 With clear
proposal, a $24 billion LBO that called for the purchase of the company's outstanding
stock at roughly $109 per share." Id.
Metropolitan claimed that upon news of management's LBO offer "the value of RJR
Nabisco's outstanding long-term debt [was reduced] . . . by almost $1 billion." Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint at 2, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., (No. 88-8266).
12 N.Y. Times, supra note 4, § 3, at 1, 21.
13 Id.
" See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981) (en banc) (corpo-
rate issuer charged with fiduciary duty to debentureholders), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981): Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Fiduciary duties in a debenture contract ... do not exist in the abstract,
but are derived from the Indenture itself."), vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.
1985): Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (in footnote to
opinion, court did not deny possibility of fiduciary relationship between issuer and bond-
holder): Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 521 A.2d 624 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(convertible debentureholder not owed fiduciary duty until he exercises conversion
privilege).
"2 See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.) (court found covenant of good
faith and fair dealing implied in convertible debenture indenture), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
947 (1975); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986) (terms of the inden-
ture, not broad concepts such as fairness, define issuer's obligation to bondholder). See also
Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1979) (no implied
covenant of good faith where subject is covered by indenture).
"2 See Bleiber, Bondholders Unite! Issuers are Getting Away with Highway Robbery, BARRON'S,
Nov. 24, 1986, 9, 9 (courts and SEC have failed to respond to plight of bondholders). See
also Sloan, supra note 10, at 67 (bond covenants fail to protect bondholders); Farrell, Bond-
holders are Mad as Hell - and No Wonder, Bus. WK., Dec. 5, 1988, 28, 28 (bondholders begin
to fight companies that turn high-grade debt into junk bonds): Boland, When Bonds Lose
Their Convertibility, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, § 3, at 10, col. 3 (bond investors should take
care to read terms of bond indenture); Weberman, Redmail, FORBES, Oct. 7, 1985, 173, 173
(takeovers adversely affect bondholders).
"7 See Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 788-89 (Del. Ch. 1987), aft d, 549 A.2d 300 (Del.
1988). The recognized view, that "[clourts traditionally have directed bondholders to pro-
tect themselves against . . . self-interested issuer action with explicit contractual provi-
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evidence indicating that excessive debt has claimed real victims,
bondholder litigation may become a standard feature of leveraged
buyouts. 18 Despite the difficulties that bondholders face in demon-
strating that a fiduciary or good faith duty should run from corpo-
rate management to bondholders, 9 it is likely that bondholder
sions," has been challenged in modern cases. Id. at 789 (quoting Bratton, supra note 1, at
668). Contra Broad, 642 F.2d at 957 (although New York contract law guarantees implied
covenant of good faith, such covenant could not give bondholders rights inconsistent with
indenture).
Traditionally, bondholder protection has been found in a contractual covenant called a
negative pledge clause. McDaniel, Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obsolete?,
38 Bus. LAw. 867, 867-68 (1983). This covenant, "found even in the debentures of triple-A
companies, . . . limits a company's ability to create secured debt that will rank ahead of
unsecured debentures." Id. at 867. It has been asserted that the negative pledge clause is
an outdated restrictive covenant that offers no protection to today's bondholder. See id. at
868. See also infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
Metropolitan has asserted that its contract with RJR, like most contracts for the purchase
of blue chip securities, did not "limit dividends or debt; nor [did it] contain other express
covenants, found in indentures for weaker companies, that are intended to guard against
financial deterioration." Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 7, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
(No. 88-8266).
I" N.Y.L.J., supra note 2, at 40, col. 2. See infra note 27 (junk bond revolution has hurt
bondholders).
" See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 88-8266 (S.D.N.Y. May 31,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The Metropolitan court recently rejected Metro-
politan's claim that RJR breached either a fiduciary or good faith duty owed to bondhold-
ers, and granted RJR's motion for summary judgment on both counts. Id. The case is cur-
rently pending on other counts. Id.
In rejecting Metropolitan's claim that RJR breached an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the court first "examine[dl the indentures to determine 'the fruits of the
agreement' between the parties." Id. The court then "decide[d] whether those 'fruits [had]
been spoiled." The court held that:
I Tjhe "fruits" of these indentures do not include an implied restrictive covenant
that would prevent the incurrence of new debt to facilitate the recent LBO. To hold
otherwise would permit these plaintiffs to straightjacket the company in order to
guarantee their investment. These plaintiffs do not invoke an implied covenant of
good faith to protect a legitimate, mutually contemplated benefit of the indentures;
rather, they seek to have this Court create an additional benefit for which they did
not bargain.
Id.
The Metropolitan court also summarily rejected plaintiffs claim that RJR management
breached a fiduciary duty owed to its bondholders. The court stated that:
Before a court recognizes the duty of a "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive," it
must be certain that the complainant is entitled to more than the "morals of the
market place," and the protections offered by actions based on fraud, state statutes
or the panoply of available federal securities laws. This Court has concluded that the
plaintiffs presently before it-sophisticated investors who are unsecured credi-
tors-are not entitled to such additional protections.
Id. (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo,
J.)).
249
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 4: 245, 1989
dissatisfaction will cause the current debt-driven market to reex-
amine the bond as a source of capital.
This Article will address the demand for greater bondholder
protection and evaluate the need to expand protection beyond
traditional contractual foundations. Part I will examine the bond
indenture and its use within the context of the stockholder-bond-
holder conflict. Part II will weigh the expansive fiduciary duty
theory of protection against the traditional contractual approach.
Finally, this Article will reject a fiduciary duty theory of protec-
tion and suggest that bondholder protection should be found
within the contractual framework of the bond indenture.
I. THE BOND INDENTURE
A. Contractual Protection
Until recently, the only protection afforded the bondholder was
that found in the bond agreement between the corporate issuer
and the bondholder."0 The bond agreement, called a trust inden-
ture, sets out the rights available to protect the interests of each
party.2 Traditionally, if a bondholder was not protected by a cov-
20 See Broad, 642 F.2d at 940. Debt securities, more so than equity securities, are "crea-
tures of contract law." Id. The American Bar Foundation characterized the protection of-
fered by the indenture agreement as follows:
The second fundamental characteristic of long-term debt financing is that the rights
of the holders of the debt securities are largely a matter of contract. There is no
governing body of statutory or common law that protects the holder of unsecured
debt securities against harmful acts by the debtor except in the most extreme situa-
tions. Short of bankruptcy, the debt security holder can do nothing to protect him-
self against actions of the borrower which jeopardize its ability to pay the debt unless
he takes a mortgage or other collateral or establishes his rights through contractual
provisions set forth in the debt agreement or indenture.
COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 1-2, quoted in Broad, 642 F.2d at 940 n.10. See also Katz v.
Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (relationship between corporation and
holders of its debt securities is contractual in nature).
21 See Bratton, supra note 1, at 667 n.2. "A trust indenture is a contract entered into
between the corporation issuing the bonds and a trustee for the benefit of the holders of
the bonds." Id. The rights of the bondholder and the issuer are stated in the indenture, as
are the mechanics of payment, the role of the trustee, and the issuer's sinking fund obliga-
tions and redemption rights. Id. The indenture also regulates the conduct of the issuer's
business and defines events of default. Id.
The contract determines the rights of the bondholder. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 1,
at 1-2, quoted in Broad, 642 F.2d at 940 n.10.
ITIhere is no body of law governing the procedures by which the holders of debt
securities may take collective action [to protect their interests]. These procedures, as
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enant expressly stated in the indenture, courts were loath to look
beyond the indenture for a remedy. 2 It was incumbent upon the
bondholder to demonstrate that his contractual protection could
be found in the indenture."3
Today's corporate environment involves LBOs, takeovers,
mergers, spin-offs and recapitalizations, all of which played a
smaller part in yesterday's economy when bond indentures were
first utilized. 2 The use of high yield bonds, also called junk
bonds,2 5 has become an increasingly popular means of financing
or defending against takeovers.2" However, the increased use of
well as the mechanics of transfer and exchange of the securities, are matters of con-
tract which are usually set out in the indenture and sometimes in the debt instru-
ment. Thus the situation is quite unlike that involved in the issuance of stock where
various substantive rights and procedural matters are in effect incorporated in the
certificate of incorporation of the issuer by operation of the applicable corporation
laws.
Id.
22 Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 786-87 (Del. Ch. 1987), affid, 549 A.2d 300 (Del.
1988). "11 It is elementary that rights of bondholders are ordinarily fixed by and determina-
ble from the language of documents that create and regulate the security. In a publicly
distributed debenture the notes themselves and a trust indenture serve this function ......
Id. See Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72, 75 (Del. 1969) (whether holder of
instrument is stockholder or creditor is determined by terms of his contract). But cf. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8363 (Purdon 1987) (recent statutory amendment enacted in Pennsyl-
vania offers extra-contractual bondholder protection by requiring directors to consider the
interests of creditors): OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Page 1985) (Ohio provides that
directors "may" consider the interests of creditors).
23 See Broad, 642 F.2d at 963 (debentureholders received all to which they were contrac-
tually entitled under the indenture); Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire,
Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no liability for breach of fiduciary duty where
defendants have fully complied with their obligations under the indenture), vacated on other
grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985); Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., No. 6827
and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Del file).
4 See McDaniel, supra note 4, at 206. The debt driven restructuring of corporate
America shows no signs of slowing. Id. See generally Lehn, Blackwell & Marr, The Economics
of Leveraged Takeovers, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 163, 163-64 (1987) [hereinafter Leveraged Take-
oversj (financing hostile takeovers becomes central issue in debate over hostile takeovers).
2" See Leveraged Takeovers, supra note 24, at 163 n. 1. Junk bonds are described as follows:
High yield debt (junk bonds) are corporate bonds that are rated below investment
grade by the major rating agencies - Standard and Poor's and Moody's Investor Ser-
vice. These ratings reflect each agency's estimate of the firm's ability to repay its
debt obligation (i.e., to pay interest and repay principal when due). The highest rat-
ing is AAA ((Aaa) for Moody's). These firms have an extremely strong ability to pay
interest and repay principal. The bonds are then ranked by this ability on the follow-
ing scale: AA(Aa), A(A), BBB(Baa), BB(Ba), B(B). Some bonds are even rated below
B. Bonds rated BB(Ba) and below are regarded as speculative bonds and are also
referred to as high-yield bonds or junk bonds.
Id.
26 Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV.
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debt as a means of fueling corporate maneuvering has had a sig-
nificant impact on bondholders.2 ' Bondholders claim that this im-
pact has been detrimental to their interests and that any resulting
benefit of excessive debt comes at the expense of the existing
bondholder.28 In asserting its fiduciary and good faith claims, Met-
ropolitan impliedly claimed that the indenture failed to provide
adequate protection in today's takeover environment. Metropoli-
tan had asked the court to look beyond the indenture in order to
prevent the transfer of wealth from existing bondholders to
stockholders.
B. Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict
Stockholders and bondholders are the largest and perhaps the
most important of the different groups comprising the corpora-
tion.29 Each of the two may be viewed as a supplier of capital to
the enterprise, possessing distinct claims against the cash flow and
assets of the corporation."
1, 47 (1986) (citing Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Noninvestment Grade Debt As a Source of Tender Offer Financing, reprinted in 11986-87
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,011 Uune 20, 1986)) [hereinafter SEC
Studyl. Junk bonds only financed I per cent of all tender offers between 1981 and 1984, yet
in 1985 that figure rose to 25 per cent. Id.
SEC Study, supra, found that internal funds of acquiring firms financed only 6.8 per cent
of takeovers in the first half of 1985, down from 47.1 per cent in 1981. Leveraged Take-
overs, supra note 24, at 163.
" See Leveraged Takeovers, supra note 24, at 185. Critics of leveraged takeovers argue
that such transactions cause bondholders and preferred stockholders significant loss of
wealth. Id. Although it is premature to conclude that junk bonds "imperil the stability of
any class of financial institutions," available evidence strongly suggests that the junk bond
revolution has adversely affected outstanding bondholders. Coffee, supra note 26, at 47,
49.
28 N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at 21, col. 3. But cf N.Y.L.J., supra note 2, at 39, col. 2
(issuers claim no breach or injury to bondholders if all required payments to bondholders
are made).
" See Kalay, Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J. FIN. EcoN. 211,
211 (1982) ("bond covenants are structured to control the conflict of interests between
stockholders and bondholders.").
SO H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 384. The totality of the corporation's debt
and equity securities is called the corporate "capital structure." Id. Yet, because of their
different claims against the corporation, bondholders and stockholders share an adverse
interest in corporate management. Comment, supra note 2, at 462.
See also COMMENTARIES, supra note i, at 1-2. The American Bar Foundation made the
following distinctions between long term debt-financing and equity financing:
In general, funds needed for financing private corporate enterprises are obtained in
exchange for interests of two essentially different kinds: (1) those of the "equity"
252
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Stockholders, as the corporate debtors, are the equitable own-
ers of the corporation and are entitled to a proportional interest
in earnings, assets and control."1 However, stockholders do not
have a fixed claim on corporate assets or cash flow and are not
entitled to regular cash distributions.3
Bondholders, on the other hand, are creditors of the corpora-
tion with fixed interests in corporate assets and cash flow.3 3 The
bondholder is generally viewed as more risk averse than the stock-
holder3 4 and has a direct interest in preserving corporate capital
and earnings in order to maximize firm value. 5 By concurrently
maximizing firm value and reducing the firm's debt to equity ra-
tio, 36 the bondholder optimally ensures an adequate equity cush-
ion so as to avoid a decline in outstanding bond value.3 7
owners or shareholders, whose securities represent certain rights of ownership, con-
trol and profit accompanied by a relatively greater risk of loss, and (2) those of the
"lenders," who classically forego control and profit in return for periodic payments
(interest and often sinking fund) without regard to profits and for repayment of
principal at a fixed date, ahead of the equity owners.
Id.
s' See Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827 and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21,
1985) (LEXIS, States library, Del file). The corporation is the legal owner of its property.
Id. Stockholders do not have a specific interest in the assets of the corporation, but they
have a right to share in the firm's profits and in the distribution of its assets upon liquida-
tion. Id. Equity securities generally create the stockholder relationship, with the stockhold-
ers acting as the insiders who own the corporation. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1,
at 383. The debt security holders are considered outsiders who are owed by the corpora-
tion. Id.
32 Comment, supra note 2, at 463. Corporate management has the discretion to deter-
mine the timing, amount and nature (cash or noncash) of any distribution to stockholders.
McDaniel, supra note 3, at 419.
" See supra note 29. See also Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827 and
6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, States Library, Del file) (debentureholders, in con-
trast to stockholders, are creditors of the corporation); Comment, supra note 2, at 463
(debentureholders have fixed and prior claim on cash flow and assets of firm: their rights
are determined at time of investment).
" See McDaniel, supra note 3, at 419. The interests of bondholders and stockholders
clash in a highly leveraged corporation where the bondholder stake is large and the stock-
holder stake is small. Id. Contributing to this conflict is the stockholder's incentive to invest
in risky projects. Id. See also Kalay, supra note 29, at 211 (the "firm is a collection of groups
whose interest can, and do, conflict.").
11 Comment, supra note 2, at 466. The reduction of corporate assets diminishes the abil-
ity of the firm to pay bondholder claims. Id.
" McDaniel, supra note 4, at 229. A firm with a high ratio of debt to equity is consid-
ered highly leveraged. Id. When leverage increases, bond prices decrease. Id. Under zero
sum theory, bondholder loss is then transformed into stockholder gain. Id.
" See id.; Comment, supra note 2, at 465 (bondholders seek to limit distributions to
shareholders, dilution of cash flow and assets, and increase in risk). See also infra note 40.
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The traditional economic assumption is that the stockholder, as
the controller of the firm, will choose investments and make deci-
sions that maximize his own wealth.38 Pursuant to this goal, the
stockholder, acting through management, has the ability to trans-
fer wealth from the bondholder to himself by enacting policies
that increase the risk of outstanding bonds.39 Toward this end,
the stockholder may choose to increase his dividend rate, decrease
the rate at which he reinvests earnings, incur additional debt or
simply substitute riskier assets for those presently held.4 Regard-
less of the means used to effect the wealth transfer, whether in the
form of a dividend or increased debt, the net effect to the bond-
holder is the same: an increased ratio of debt to equity which
38 See Kalay, supra note 29, at 211 (stockholder expected to maximize his own wealth);
Barkey, supra note 4, at 49 (corporate assets efficiently used when present value
maximized).
11 See Bratton, supra note 1, at 668 n.3. Distribution to shareholders is not in bond-
holder's best interest. Id. "Management, if left unconstrained, could use the proceeds of a
debenture issue to declare a dividend to shareholders. ... Comment, supra note 2, at
466. See also Kalay, supra note 29, at 211 (shareholders control firm and are expected to
maximize own wealth); Note, Fiduciary Duties of Directors: How Far Do They Go?, 23 WAKE
FORsT L. REV. 163, 173 (1988) ("directors must seek to maximize the value of the corpora-
tion's stock without direct regard for the value of other classes of its securities.").
0 See Bratton, supra note 1, at 667-68. Incurring additional debt or substituting riskier
assets for existing ones reduces the value of the bonds without "reducing the value of the
stockholders' participation in the issuer." Id. at 668.
Stockholder wealth is maximized if the issuer distributes to the stockholders all capi-
tal which the issuer cannot invest for a rate of return higher than that available to
the stockholder elsewhere. Such a distribution might take any one of a number of
forms - an ordinary cash dividend, a spin-off or other distribution in kind, or a pay-
ment in connection with a redemption or other repurchase of outstanding shares. In
contrast, the issuer maximizes bondholder wealth if it retains all earnings and other
capital which it can reinvest for a positive return. Distributions to stockholders are
not in the bondholder's interest because any decrease in the value of the issuer's
assets increases the likelihood of default on the bonds.
Id. at 668 n.3.
See McDaniel, supra note 3, at 418-21. Any increase in debt increases a corporation's
debt to equity ratio. Id. at 418. In a business downturn when earnings are reduced, debt
increases the risk of default because as a fixed cost it can not be reduced. Id. Stockholder-
bondholder conflict exists because bondholders have prior fixed claims on corporate assets,
while stockholders have limited liability for corporate debt and unlimited claims on its re-
maining assets. Id.
For a contrasting view of stockholder self-interest, see Kalay, supra note 29, at 227. Evi-
dence suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms choose to limit the ability to pay divi-
dends. Id. Surprisingly, stockholders do not pay out as much in debt financed dividends as
they otherwise might, in effect, causing a transfer of wealth from themselves to the bond-
holders. Id. at 227.
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causes a subsequent decline in bond value. 4
The problem of stockholder-bondholder adversity becomes
more acute when one focuses on the role of corporate manage-
ment. In theory, the director manages the affairs of the corpora-
tion. 42 In carrying out his responsibilities, the director acts as a
fiduciary for the corporation and its shareholders. 43 As such, he is
bound by the strict duties of care and undivided loyalty.
4
Traditionally, fiduciary and good faith theories of protection
have been reserved for stockholders. 4" Bondholders, because they
were viewed as contractually protected creditors of the corpora-
tion, were not deemed to be entitled to the benefit of this protec-
tion.46 However, recent case law signifies a changing viewpoint. 47
"' See McDaniel, supra note 3, at 419 (new debt drives down existing bond prices).
" See Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827 and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21,
1985) (LEXIS, States Library, Del file) (directors manage corporate matters): DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) ("the business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be
managed under the direction of a board of directors").
" See, e.g., United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967) (fiduciary relation-
ship exists between corporate director and shareholder). See also Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch.
255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939), cited with approval in Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare
Corp., Nos. 6827 and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, States Library, Del file).
Directors, while technically not trustees, "stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation
and its stockholders." Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (emphasis added). Fiduciary duty is grounded in
"public policy . . . and demands of the corporate officer or director .. .the most scrupu-
lous observance of his duty ... ." Id. It requires an "undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation...." Id. (emphasis added).
'4 See Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex. v. Rifle, 381 F.2d 646, 650 (10th Cir.) ("corporation is
entitled to have its officers and directors actively promote its interests, and not to place
themselves in a position where their personal interests conflict or could conflict, with those
of the corporation."), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967); Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare
Corp., Nos. 6827 and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (LEXIS, States Library, Del file)
(director's fiduciary duty is one of undivided loyalty).
" E.g., Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 788 (Del. Ch. 1987), affd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del.
1988). Delaware courts have "consistently recognized that neither an issuer of debentures
nor a controlling shareholder owes to holders of the company's debt securities duties of the
special sort characterized as fiduciary in character." Id.
See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1084 (2d Cir.
1977) (no federal fiduciary duties exist to deal fairly with corporate debentureholders);
Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827 and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985)
(LEXIS, States library, Del file) (interprets prior Delaware case law as strongly suggesting
convertible debentureholder may not state claim for breach of fiduciary duty).
" See Simons, 542 A.2d at 786 ("Broad and abstract requirements of a 'fiduciary' charac-
ter . . . have little or no constructive role to play in the governance of such a negotiated,
commercial relationship."). See also cases cited supra note 45.
"I E.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 958 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981) (en banc)
(corporate directors may have fiduciary duty to debentureholders), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
965 (1981); Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire Inc., 589 F. Supp. 669, 673
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (fiduciary duties in debenture contract are derived from the indenture
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II. THEORIES OF BONDHOLDER PROTECTION
Recent decisions reveal that some courts have taken an innova-
tive approach to establish bondholder protection. The most un-
conventional of the innovative views is the theory that a fiduciary
duty is owed to both stockholders and bondholders.48 Fiduciary law
springs from agency doctrine, and has long been recognized as a
fundamental element of corporate policy. 49 To a lesser extent,
protection has also been established under a theory of good faith
and fair dealing, arising as an implied contractual covenant."0
Courts that have recognized these theories have not restricted
bondholder protection to the provisions of the indenture. Instead,
they have ventured beyond the four corners of the indenture and
have utilized expansive remedial measures in an effort to aid the
bondholder.
A. Fiduciary Duty
The notion that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to
bondholders originated in Pepper v. Litton."t In Pepper, a control-
ling stockholder obtained a judgment against the issuing corpora-
tion after it became insolvent, but before it was adjudicated bank-
itself), vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985); Green v. Hamilton int'l Corp.,
437 F. Supp. 723, 729 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (recognizing fiduciary duty to
creditors in certain circumstances); Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found., 589 F. Supp. at
673 (director's fiduciary duty to bondholders is derived from the indenture): Fox v. MGM
Grand Hotels, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 3d 524, 527, 187 Cal. Rptr. 141, 143 (1982) (corpora-
tion has fiduciary duty to not intentionally prejudice its unsecured creditors). See also Mc-
Daniel, supra note 3, at 443-50. The author discusses the relevant case law which recog-
nizes a fiduciary relationship between corporate directors and bondholders. Id.
", Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 826 (1988)
("fiduciary duty of corporate directors has long been recognized."). The interests of the
corporation are to be given priority over the director's personal interests. Id. "There can
be no question that the purpose of legally imposed fiduciary obligations is to induce manag-
ers to act in conformity with the expectations and interests of the shareholders." Hether-
ington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 9, 16 (1987).
5' See, e.g., Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 544, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94,
103 (1979) (court found implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in bond inden-
ture); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(obligation of good faith implied in bond agreement); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d
873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same). See also McDaniel, supra note 4, at 275 (discusses case law
which recognizes covenant of good faith and fair dealing stemming from bond contract).
, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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rupt.52 When Pepper, a creditor, filed a claim against the
corporation he found that the remaining assets were insufficient
to satisfy his claim.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court, subordinated
the controlling stockholder's claim to that of Pepper's.54 The
Court held that the defendant stockholder occupied a fiduciary
position and, as such, was prohibited from taking action which was
for his own benefit and to the detriment of creditors.55 The Court
declared that a "fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection
of the entire community of interests in the corporation - creditors
as well as stockholders. '5 6
Justice Douglas's comment from Pepper is cited frequently as a
basis for recognizing a fiduciary duty between directors and bond-
holders. While it is true that the Court includes creditors among
those who have an interest in the corporation, a fair interpreta-
tion of Pepper should not venture beyond the actual facts of the
case. The facts in Pepper speak to a fiduciary duty within the con-
text of bankruptcy. Despite the expansive interpretation often
51 Id. at 297.
53 Id. at 298.
" Id. at 302.
" Id. at 311. In recognizing the fiduciary status of a director or controlling stockholder,
Justice Douglas stated the following:
[A fiduciaryl cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment
of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power may
be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that
power is at all times subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exercised
for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion
or detriment of the [beneficiariesl.
Id.
56 Id. at 307.
"' See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Incident to the corporate reorganization of
AT&T, a consent decree established the terms for the division of assets and liabilities be-
tween AT&T and its subsidiaries. Id. at 208. The terms of the decree were challenged in
court. Id. The court held that AT&T, as majority stockholder of the operating subsidiaries,
"has the fiduciary duty to protect all those with interests in these companies, including
creditors." Id. at 205. The court cited Pepper as authority for extending the fiduciary duty
to creditors, including bondholders. Id. See also McDaniel, supra note 4, at 275 (discussing
cases which cite Pepper as authority). But see Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App.
3d 531, 545, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 103 (1979) (court refused to extend fiduciary obligations to
creditors of corporation); Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72, 75 (Del. 1969)
(court found that bondholders, as creditors, possessed rights determined by their contract,
not by fiduciary duty): see infra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text (interpreting Pepper
as only applying to bankruptcy cases).
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given to Justice Douglas's words, the holding in Pepper declares
that a director or controlling stockholder has a duty to distribute
equitably the assets of an insolvent or bankrupt enterprise.58
Given this narrow reading, it would be difficult to construe Pepper
as supporting the notion that directors are charged with a fiduci-
ary duty to bondholders, or other creditors, in any situation prior
to insolvency. 59
Nevertheless, a number of cases have given Pepper an expansive
reading, extending corporate management's fiduciary duty to
bondholders. One such case is Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp.60 In
Green, the plaintiffs were convertible bondholders who alleged
that the issuer's directors deliberately concealed merger negotia-
tions in order to prevent the bondholders from exercising their
conversion privileges.6" The court held that the bondholders'
" See Bratton, supra note 1, at 734 n.247. Bratton believes that Justice Douglas meant
that a fiduciary duty to creditors should be imposed upon controlling stockholders only
after insolvency. Id. This is not inconsistent with the concept that bondholders' rights,
prior to insolvency, are determined by their contract. Id. Bratton states that the recogni-
tion of a fiduciary relationship between creditors and controlling stockholders, after insol-
vency, "has always constituted an exception to the state law contract and corporate law
dichotomy." Id. But see supra note 57 (imposition of fiduciary duties to creditors of AT&T
prior to insolvency): Great W. Producers Coop. v. Great W. United Corp., 200 Colo. 180,
613 P.2d 873 (1980). Great Western United Corporation (United) owned the Great West-
ern Sugar Company (Sugar Company). Id. at 181, 613 P.2d at 875. As part of a recapitali-
zation effort, United agreed to sell Sugar Company to Great Western Producers Coopera-
tive (Co-op). Id. The sale was conditioned on the approval of United's shareholders and
debentureholders. Id. at 182, 613 P.2d at 875. United agreed to use "best efforts" to se-
cure such approval. Id. Co-op claimed that United breached its best efforts obligation. Id.
at 184, 613 P.2d at 877. The Colorado court recognized that directors of a solvent corpora-
tion owe fiduciary duties to all of the corporation's security holders - stockholders as well as
bondholders. Id. at 186, 613 P.2d at 878. See also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J.
15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). The New Jersey Supreme Court held that directors of certain
corporations owe a duty to creditors even when the corporation is solvent, if the corpora-
tion holds funds of others in trust. Id. at 36, 432 A.2d at 824. But see id. The court also
stated that "while directors may owe a fiduciary duty to creditors[,1 . . . that obligation
generally has not been recognized in the absence of insolvency." Id.
" See Bratton, supra note 1, at 734 n.247. See also Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 789
n.7 (Del. Ch. 1987) (Pepper holding should not be extended beyond bankruptcy), affid, 549
A.2d 300 (Del. 1988). But see supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussion of cases
which have extended Pepper's holding); infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (same).
00 437 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
I1 Id. at 726. Plaintiffs' bonds were redeemable on October 31, 1976. Id. The indenture
provided that the bonds could be converted into stock at a conversion rate of $2.25. Id. In
the two weeks before October 31, 1976, the Hamilton stock was trading at less than the
conversion rate. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs chose to redeem rather than to convert. Id.
On November 4, 1976, Hamilton announced that it would be merged into another com-
pany and that the acquiring company was going to pay $4.00 per share. Id. Plaintiffs de-
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complaint adequately stated a cause of action based on fraud. 2
However, the significance of Green stems from the court's recogni-
tion that the corporate directors may have breached a fiduciary
duty owed to the bondholders.6 3 As justification for this dicta, the
court cited Pepper and stated that the bondholders were part of
"the entire community of interests in the corporation. '64
In Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,65 the Fifth Circuit added a
unique twist to the concept of 'fiduciary obligation. The plaintiffs
in Broad were convertible bondholders who claimed a breach of
both a fiduciary duty and of the underlying bond indenture. The
plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by the elimination of
their conversion rights under a merger agreement. 66 Like Green,
the court cited Pepper as authority for its determination that a fi-
manded recision of the redemption transaction so that they could instead convert to stock
and receive $4.00 per share in the merger. Id. Defendant Hamilton refused to rescind the
transaction. Id.
I2 d. at 729.
I' d. at 729 n.4. In Green, the court interpreted Delaware law as recognizing that fiduci-
ary duties to convertible bondholders may exist because the convertible bonds create an
equity interest in the corporation similar to stock. Id. See Note, supra note 39, at 179 (dis-
cussing Green). But see Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 790 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff d, 549 A.2d
300 (Del. 1988). The court in Simons rejected the analysis of the Green court for two rea-
sons. Id. First, the Green court was said to have simply misinterpreted Delaware law. Id.
The Green court recognized a fiduciary duty to convertible bondholders where, in fact, the
Delaware courts have expressly disavowed such a notion. Id. Secondly, the Simons court
stated that Green incorrectly afforded equity status to convertible bondholders. Id. at 791.
The Simons court restated the status of convertible bondholders as follows:
IThe holder of a convertible bond is and only is a corporate creditor to whom con-
tractual but not fiduciary duties are owed unless he acts to end his entitlement to the
legal protection his contract affords him and to assume the risks of stockholder sta-
tus through exercise of the power of conversion.
Id. See also Parkinson v. West End St. Ry., 173 Mass. 446, 448, 53 N.E. 891, 892 (1899)
(convertible bondholder has mere creditor status, not stockholder status).
Green, 437 F. Supp. at 729 n.4.
*6 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
Id. at 933. Collins Radio Co. sold convertible bonds due 1987 with a conversion price
of $72.50. Id. at 934. In 1967, when the bonds were issued, Collins' stock traded at $60.
Id. Subsequently, Collins became financially troubled; as a result its stock traded for as low
as $9.75. Id. Thereafter, Rockwell invested $35 million in Collins and gained control of its
board of directors. Id. Rockwell then acquired Collins in a cash merger. Id. Prior to the
merger, the bonds were traded at a substantial discount. Id. at 935. Following the merger,
the market value increased dramatically due to Rockwell's superior credit rating. Id. But
pursuant to a provision in the original bond indenture, the bondholders could "convert the
Debenture into the amount of cash that would have been payable with respect to the num-
ber of shares of Collins Common Stock into which the Debenture could have been con-
verted immediately prior to effectiveness of the proposed merger." Id. at 936. "Thus, after
the merger, a $1000 Debenture [was worth] . . . $344.75 in cash." Id.
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duciary duty ran from a controlling stockholder to bondholders.
However, the court held that while the controlling shareholder
owed a fiduciary duty to the bondholders, that duty was fully dis-
charged by complying with the terms of the bond indenture.
Therefore, only in the event of a contractual breach could there
be a breach of fiduciary duty.
The court in Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire
Inc.6 8 followed the rationale of the Broad court," stating that
"[f]iduciary duties in a debenture contract . . .do not exist in the
abstract, but are derived from the Indenture itself."'7 0 The court's
statement equates a contractual breach to a breach of fiduciary
duty.7'
Green, Broad and Gardner indicate that some courts have been
willing to recognize a fiduciary relationship between corporate
management and the holders of corporate debt. However, the ra-
tionales invoked in these cases are both confusing and unpersua-
sive. The Broad court, for example, created a new standard of fi-
duciary responsibility by arbitrarily requiring a contractual breach
before recognizing a breach of fiduciary duty. In holding that
6I Id. at 958. Cf Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). Judge Gibbons, writing for the majority,
opined that "we would be very much surprised if Maryland or any other state would today
hold that no Ifiduciary] obligations were owed by an issuer of [convertiblej securities and
its directors." Id. at 941. See also McDaniel, supra note 4, at 293. McDaniel interprets Pitts-
burgh Terminal to hold that directors owe a fiduciary duty to convertible bondholders. Id.
But see Pittsburgh Terminal, 680 F.2d at 943. McDaniel's conclusion is questionable given
that Judge Gibbons's statement was dictum. See id. Judge Garth concurred in the judgment,
but refused to speculate on whether a fiduciary duty to bondholders existed under Mary-
land law. Id. at 946 (Garth, J., concurring). Judge Adams, dissenting, disagreed with Judge
Gibbons's recognition of a fiduciary duty and stated that convertible bondholders are
"mere creditoris] until conversion, whose relationship with the issuing corporation is gov-
erned by contract and statute." Id. at 947 (Adams, J., dissenting). See also Simons v. Cogan,
542 A.2d 785, 790 (Del. Ch. 1987), affd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (discussion of Judge
Gibbons's unpersuasive recognition of fiduciary duty in Pittsburgh Terminal).
8 589 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.
1985).
69 Id. at 673. The plaintiffs, who were convertible bondholders, alleged that the merger
"effectively destroyed the value of their conversion right because the new Empire stock
into which they are now entitled to convert is worth considerably less than the old Empire
stock." Id. Plaintiffs contended that this constituted a breach of the directors' fiduciary
duty owed to them as bondholders. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 674 (fulfillment of contract terms satisfies fiduciary duties). See also McDaniel,
supra note 4, at 279 (discussion of Gardner and its reliance on Broad).
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contractual and fiduciary obligations are intertwined, the court
clearly confused its doctrinal analysis. Broad mistakenly applied a
contractual obligation of implied good faith to corporate fiduciary
law. 7' Rather than applying the more burdensome fiduciary obli-
gation, the court apparently intended to impose the lesser con-
tractual standard of implied good faith and fair dealing.7 3
In light of this apparent intention, Broad should be construed as
actually recognizing only a contractual relationship between man-
agement and creditor.74 So construed, Broad conforms to the ma-
jority view that bondholder protection is contractual in nature. 7
B. Contract Law
As discussed in subsection A of Part I, the bondholder has tra-
ditionally found protection only within the provisions of the in-
denture.7 ' The most influential case espousing the traditional view
is Parkinson v. West End St. Ry." In Parkinson, Justice Holmes un-
equivocally stated that the holder of a convertible bond "does not
become a stockholder, by his contract, in equity any more than at
law." 7 In so stating, Justice Holmes established that contract law,
rather than corporate fiduciary law, should form the basis of
" See Bratton, supra note 1, at 720 (discussion of court's doctrinal confusion).
" See Broad, 642 F.2d at 958. Indicative of the court's doctrinal confusion is the follow-
ing statement made by Judge Randall: "[I]f. .. Rockwell had fully complied with its obliga-
tions under the Indenture, its fiduciary obligations also would have been discharged as a
matter of law." Id.
"4 See Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785, 789 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff d, 549 A.2d 300 (Del.
1988). The Broad court's assumption that a fiduciary duty existed between directors and
bondholders can only be interpreted as supporting the traditional contractual relationship
between directors and bondholders. Id. This is so because the court incorrectly confused
the fiduciary duty with the implied covenant of good faith. Id. When this issue was decided
by the Second Circuit, the court was careful to explain that the good faith owed to the
bondholders originated in the contract and not in a newly born fiduciary duty to bondhold-
ers. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1977). The Van Gemert court
indicated that the "appellants' right to damages arose out of their contract with Boeing."
Id.
" See Simons, 542 A.2d at 790 (majority of jurisdictions refuse to extend fiduciary con-
cept to relationship between directors or corporations and bondholders); see supra notes
19-23 and accompanying text (discussion of cases which utilize contract law, not corporate
law, to determine rights and duties of bondholders and directors).
" See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussion of traditional contractual
protection).
" 173 Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 (1899).
78 Id. at 448, 53 N.E. at 892.
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bond-holder protection."9
The Delaware courts, which exert considerable influence in the
area of corporate law, have consistently held that no fiduciary du-
ties exist between corporate directors and holders of debt securi-
ties.80 A clear expression of Delaware's refusal to accord fiduciary
status to bondholders can be found in Simons v. Cogan.81 In Simons,
a merger of two related companies resulted in the execution of a
supplemental indenture which crucially altered the convertibility
" See Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72, 75 (Del. 1969) (no breach of
fiduciary duty because bondholders are creditors and their rights are determined by their
contract). See also Barkey, supra note 4, at 64 (bondholders are not equitable owners and
thus have no standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty); Bratton, supra note 1, at 731
(bondholder remedy is strictly contractual).
80 See, e.g., Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 521 A.2d 624, 630 (Del.
Ch. 1987) (convertible bondholders are not owed fiduciary duties), affd, 545 A.2d 1171
(Del. 1988); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc. 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same); Norte &
Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., Nos. 6827 and 6831 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (LEXIS,
States library, Del file) (same).
Another significant Delaware case is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, Pantry Pride, in an attempt to acquire Revlon, made
a hostile tender offer for all of Revlon's shares. Id. at 176. In response, Revlon bought
back approximately one-third of its common stock in exchange for subordinated notes. Id.
at 177. The notes contained covenants restricting Revlon's ability to incur debt, sell assets
or pay dividends. Id. This action was taken in order to deter Pantry Pride from acquiring
Revlon with junk bond financing. Id. However, Pantry Pride persisted and Revlon subse-
quently negotiated for a leveraged buyout by Forstmann Little & Company. Id. at 178.
Revlon waived the restrictive covenants in the notes in order to enable Forstmann Little to
finance the leveraged buyout by incurring new debt. Id. The waiver of the restrictive cove-
nants caused the market value of the notes to drop. Id. Due to the prospect of litigation by
noteholders, Forstmann Little agreed to exchange the old notes for new notes with a
higher interest rate. Id. at 179. However, Pantry Pride ultimately topped Forstmann's of-
fer. Id. Pantry Pride sued to enjoin the issuance of the notes to Revlon shareholders. Id.
The trial court held that the Revlon directors breached their fiduciary duty to their share-
holders "by making concessions to Forstmann, out of concern for their liability to the note-
holders, rather than maximizing the sale price of the company for the stockholders bene-
fit." Id. With respect to noteholders, the Revlon court stated that their rights were
determined by contract, not by any fiduciary duties. Id. at 182-83. The court also recog-
nized an implied contractual obligation of good faith. Id. See also McDaniel, supra note 4, at
287-89 (detailed discussion of Revlon).
8' 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987), affd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988). Chancellor Allen suc-
cinctly restated Delaware law as follows:
It has now become firmly fixed in our law that among the duties owed by directors
of a Delaware corporation to holders of that corporation's debt instruments, there is
no duty of the broad and exacting nature characterized as a fiduciary duty. Unlike
shareholders, to whom such duties are owed, holders of debt may turn to documents
that exhaustively detail the rights and obligations of the issuer . ...
Id. at 786. As support for this statement, the Simons court cited Harff, Wolfensohn, Revlon,
and Katz. Id. at 786 n.l. See also supra note 63 (discussion of Simons).
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option of the surviving corporation's bondholders.82 The bond-
holders sued for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and
fraud.83 The Simons court stated that the rights of bondholders
are determined by their contract and, in limited situations, by im-
plied covenants of good faith and fair dealing arising out of their
contract. 4 Significantly, the court determined that good faith and
fiduciary obligations were not intertwined. The court concluded
that the plaintiff bondholders were not the beneficiaries of a fidu-
ciary obligation and therefore had no right to maintain a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.85
Another example of Delaware's denial of bondholder fiduciary
protection is Harff v. Kerkorian.8" In Harf, bondholders brought a
derivative action against Kerkorian, a director and controlling
shareholder of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM)." The bondholders
contended that the board of directors of MGM declared a cash
dividend for the financial benefit of Kerkorian. 8 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the dividend caused a loss to them by forcing a decline
in the market value of their convertible bonds.89 In denying the
bondholders' claim that the dividend declaration was a breach of
the directors' fiduciary duty to the bondholders, the court echoed
the words of Justice Holmes in Parkinson,9" holding that "deben-
tureholders are not stockholders and their rights are determined
02 Id. at 787-88 ($12 consideration given in place of right to convert to class A shares).
81 Id. at 788.
8I Id. at 787. Although obligations of good faith and fair dealing are sometimes found, it
is rare because of the extensively detailed nature of the agreements themselves. See id. See,
e.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).
The court found an implied covenant of good faith in the bond contract. Id. at 1387.
Subsequently, the holding in Van Gemert has been construed as wholly contractual. Cf,
Simons, 542 A.2d at 789-90. But see Van Gemert, 520 F.2d at 1382-83 n.19. One of the
judges stated that the corporation or directors may have owed a fiduciary duty to the bond-
holder. Id.
11 Simons, 542 A.2d at 791. In justifying this conclusion, the court wrote that "lclourts
traditionally have directed bondholders to protect themselves against ... issuer action with
explicit contractual provisions. Holders of senior securities, such as bonds, are outside the
legal model of the firm for protective purposes: a heavy black-letter line bars the extension
of corporate fiduciary protection to them." Id. at 789 (quoting Bratton, supra note I).
"6 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), affid in part, rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975).
87 324 A.2d at 217.
88 Id.
89 Id.
" Id. at 219. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussion of Parkinson).
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by their contract."''
Despite the established tradition of contract law as the only pro-
tection available to bondholders, many scholars and commentators
insist that today's takeover atmosphere requires more effective
bond-holder protection.92 In arguing for expanded protection,
they contend that the contract measure of protection, because of
its complexity,9 3 is too costly and is inadequate in its ability to
foresee, and therefore guard against, potential bondholder
hazards. 94
While it is recognized that the contract theory of protection has
its shortcomings, 95 the imposition of a fiduciary duty would com-
plicate, rather than solve, existing problems.96 Given the conflict
91 Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, 347
A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). See also Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). In
Katz, Oak Industries was in financial trouble. Id. at 875. As a result, the corporation's
bonds were trading at a large discount. Id. at 875 n.2. As part of a recapitalization, Oak
offered to exchange stock and "payment certificates" for its bonds and solicited consents to
delete restrictive covenants in the bonds. Id. at 876-77. Plaintiff, a bondholder, sought to
enjoin the consummation of the exchange offer and consent solicitation. Id. at 878. The
court relied, inter alia, on Harff and the ABF COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES, supra note 1,
and held that the relationship between a bondholder and a corporation or director is con-
tractual in nature. Id. at 879. The court refused to recognize a fiduciary duty. Id. However,
the court did recognize that there is an implied covenant of good faith in every contract,
including a bond indenture. Id. at 880.
92 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussion of director's fiduciary duty).
. See McDaniel, supra note 4, at 236-37 (provides empirical evidence which shows de-
cline in use of restrictive covenants due to their high costs); McDaniel, supra note 3, at 424-
26 (same): Prokesch, Merger Wave: How Stock and Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at
D4, col. 2 ("Unfortunately for investors in publicly traded debt securities, the trend in the
past decade or so has been toward fewer covenants."). But cf Broad v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947-48 n.20 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981) (en banc) (use of covenants pre-
serves expectation and promotes certainty), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981): Bratton,
supra note 1, at 697 (even though contracting can be costly, it is preferred over fiduciary
duty theory because it creates consistent and predictable results).
" See Bratton, supra note 1, at 688. The bond indenture is inadequate because it fails to
address a sufficient number of contingencies. Id. at 689. Much of the past litigation has
arisen out of the failure of the bond contract to protect against unforeseen events. Id. See
also McDaniel, supra note 4, at 235. Bond contracts are inadequate because they cannot
contain a complete set of restrictions since it is impossible to foresee every contingency. Id.
at 235-36. Also, bond contracts are inadequate because management will resist the inclu-
sion of the covenants because they impinge upon its flexibility. Id. at 236. But see Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 469. In private debt issues, large institutional lenders have sufficient
bargaining power to counteract management's resistance. Id.
" See McDaniel, supra note 4, at 237. Restrictive covenants are crude constraints at best,
and are ineffective at reducing the agency costs of debt. Id. Complex contracts are too
costly. See McDaniel, supra note 3, at 428-29.
" See Comment, supra note 2. Imposing a fiduciary duty on management to act in the
best interest of bondholders ignores the fundamental differences that exist in the nature of
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between the interests of stockholders and bondholders, it would
be difficult to reconcile the agency entanglements that would nec-
essarily arise if director loyalty were divided between stockholder
and bondholder." In terms of efficiency, serving two masters with
vastly different interests would impair management's ability to
make critical business decisions.98
It is suggested that a more rational and practical solution to the
problem of bondholder wealth transfer lies within the means of
available contractual protection. Where arms-length bargaining
determines the resulting contractual obligations, there is no need
to create a fiduciary relationship." Rather, the imposition of a fi-
duciary duty on bargain transactions should be limited to those
transactions in which an arms-length bargain is not possible.' 0
Generally, the issuer-bondholder transaction is an arms-length
transaction and, as such, management should not be encumbered
by fiduciary restraints.'
Today's bondholder, whether a large enterprise or an individ-
ual, is not constrained to accept unreasonable risk. The bond in-
bondholder and stockholder claims which are asserted against the corporation. Id. at 483.
Similarly, the nature of the relationship between bondholders and the corporation and
stockholders and the corporation are themselves fundamentally distinct. Id. Corporate di-
rectors are agents of the stockholders, but not of the bondholder. Id. See also Bratton,
supra note 1, at 732. The basis for the imposition of corporate fiduciary duties is the exis-
tence of an agency relationship. Id. Since the relationship between bondholders and direc-
tors is contractual, not one of trust or agency, no fiduciary duties arise. Id. at 731.
From a contractual standpoint, the investment community relies upon a uniform inter-
pretation of bond indentures. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691
F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982). To include good faith or fiduciary requirements in bond-
holder transactions would disrupt the efficiency of the marketplace and upset investor ex-
pectation. See Id.
See also supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text (discussion of conflicts between bond-
holders and stockholders). But see McDaniel, supra note 3, at 442-50 (advocates imposition
of fiduciary duty to bondholders); Note, supra note 63, at 173-80 (same).
' Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (fiduciary duty calls for
undivided loyalty).
" See Farrell, supra note 16, at 28 (serving two masters with different interests is tricky
at best). "No man can serve two masters. He will either hate one and love the other or be
attentive to one and despise the other." Matthew 6:24.
" Comment, supra note 2, at 483-84. To impose fiduciary obligations on debtor-creditor
relationship is to ignore past success in bargaining transactions. Id. at 484. But see Note,
supra note 63, at 177-80 (bondholders and stockholders are investors of equal status, so
fiduciary duty should be extended to bondholders as well).
0 See Comment, supra note 2, at 484.
o See Bratton, supra note 1, at 708 (since institutions hold most convertible bonds, it is
reasonable to infer that most convertible bond holders are well-informed investors).
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denture is available to protect his interests. The ability to demand
and obtain concessions from an issuer depends on the bond-
holder's bargaining power.' 2 Metropolitan Life Insurance, for ex-
ample, is a sophisticated financial institution and is clearly in a bet-
ter position to demand contractual protection than is a small
investor. Yet, even the small investor will reap the contractual
benefits of a bond issuance shaped by the demands of large
investors.
Contract theory recognizes the practical reality that an investor
is able to shop around in the hope of finding an issuer to suit his
needs. If an issuer is unwilling to provide additional protection or
increased interest rates as compensation for incurring increased
risk, investors are free to negotiate elsewhere. 3 At this stage,
however, because bondholders have only recently realized the ad-
verse effects of the current debt market, they are only just begin-
ning to flex their economic muscle."0
In criticizing the limitations of bond indentures, commentators
have attacked the inadequacy of restrictive covenants employed to
protect bondholders.0 5 The most common restrictive covenant is
the negative pledge clause, which restricts a company's ability to
create secured debt that will rank ahead of unsecured deben-
.02 See id. In the exercise of his contractual power, the bondholder has available "an
arsenal of traditional weapons" to protect his interests. N.Y.L.J., supra note 2, at 40, col. 2.
To counteract the potentially adverse effects of wealth transfer, the bondholder could
negotiate additional new indenture provisions. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., No. 88-8266 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). For instance,
the Metropolitan court proposed that:
[Metropolitan could request] new provisions [which] could include special debt re-
strictions or change-of-control covenants. There is no guarantee, of course, that
companies like RJR Nabisco would accept such new covenants: parties retain the
freedom to enter into contracts as they choose. But presumably, multibillion dollar
investors like plaintiffs have some say in the terms of the investments they make and
continue to hold. And, presumably, companies like RJR Nabisco need the infusions
of capital such investors are capable of providing.
Id.
103 McDaniel, supra note 3, at 434. The market forces are a source of bondholder pro-
tection. Id. As a result of corporate action to the detriment of bondholders, future inves-
tors will demand more from that company. Id. For example, investors will seek higher
interest rates or more extensive restrictive covenants. Id. at 434-35.
014 Coffee, supra note 26, at 45 (junk bond market is a relatively new institution): see
supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussion of recent surge of junk bond financing).
106 See McDaniel, supra note 3, at 424-26. See also Farrell, supra note 5, at 114 (any good
lawyer can get around any type of protective covenant). Cf supra note 93 and accompany-
ing text (use of restrictive covenants is declining).
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tures.'0 The negative pledge clause prevents "an issuer from pre-
ferring future debt holders at the expense of existing
debentureholders."' 0
7
Today, the negative pledge clause offers little protection to the
bondholder because it only restricts the creation of secured
debt.10 8 The fact that modern issuers usually borrow on an un-
secured basis has rendered the negative pledge clause ineffec-
tive. '09 While it is true that the negative pledge is outdated, a new
type of restrictive covenant called a "poison put" offers increased
bondholder protection."0 A poison put gives the debtholder the
right to cash out at par value if there occurs a significant change
in the issuer's financial structure or management."' Some issuers,
rather than providing a cash out option, compensate the bond-
holder for subsequent issuer changes by increasing the interest
rate so that the bond trades at par.1"'
Poison puts have been criticized as inefficient because they se-
verely restrict management's control over a company."13 It is
claimed that these provisions give the bondholder too much con-
trol over management."' Yet, despite the loss in control, compa-
nies continue to issue bonds with poison put provisions. The pres-
ence of this powerful new restrictive covenant is some evidence
106 McDaniel, supra note 17, at 867. A "negative pledge clause limits the amount of
mortgage debt a company can incur." McDaniel, supra note 3, at 427. There is little mana-
gerial resistance to these clauses because, unless the corporation is in extreme financial
trouble, managers do not mortgage their plants to raise money. Id. As protection against a
merger, many indentures include a provision which says that the debentureholder:
[Sjhall have the right thereafter and until the expiration of the period of convertibil-
ity to convert such Debenture into the kind and amount of stock, securities or assets
receivable . . . by a holder of the number of shares of Common Stock into which
such Debenture might have been converted immediately prior to such . . . merger
COMMENTARIES, supra note I, at 549-50.
107 McDaniel, supra note 17, at 871; see Comment, supra note 2, at 467 ("negative
pledge clause prevents management from creating debt senior to that of the debenture
holders").
108 See generally McDaniel, supra note 17, at 868-70 (negative pledge clause offers little
protection because issuers can borrow on an unsecured basis).
109 Id.
1o See N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at 21, col. 5.
I Id.
112 Id.
"IS Farrell, supra note 6, at 83. "It ties too severely the hands of management." Id.
11 Id.
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that companies are beginning to acquiesce to bondholder demand
for greater protection. In the context of the bargaining relation-
ship between issuer and bondholder, the poison put demonstrates
that contractual provisions can provide the necessary bondholder
protection.
There is one last contractual provision that shows excellent
promise as a source of bondholder protection: bond insurance." 5
This form of protection would shift the risk from the bondholder
to the insurer."' However, a number of factors, including the is-
suer's additional cost of coverage, the issuer's reluctance to give
additional covenants required by insurance companies and the
possibility that insurers may not extend insurance over the life of
a long-term bond, all indicate that bondholders would have to ex-
ert considerable pressure on issuers before such a significant
change could take place.""
CONCLUSION
Faced with the prospect that their investments involve unfore-
seeable risk caused by spectacular debt financing, bondholders are
demanding expanded protection. Some courts have responded by
recognizing certain fiduciary and good faith requirements running
to the bondholder. Metropolitan, having suffered a multimillion
dollar loss in its bond portfolio, sought to further the burgeoning
trend toward fiduciary protection. Yet, despite the cases and com-
mentary to the contrary, no justifiable rationale exists for recog-
nizing a fiduciary relationship between corporate management
and bondholders. Their adverse interests in the corporation pre-
clude the imposition of "the finest loyalty""' 8 or equivalent stan-
dard of care. Bondholders, therefore, would be well advised to
abandon any attempt to redefine traditional notions of agency and
corporate policy, and to pursue instead the more readily available
" See McDaniel, supra note 3, at 436-39 (insurance may completely protect
bondholders).
116 Id. at 436.
"' See Id. at 437-38 (bond market will decide whether insurance is effective protection
against risk).
.. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). "IThe rule
of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme ..... Id. at 468, 164 N.E. at 548 (citations
omitted).
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protection that can be found in the bond indenture.
Thomas E. Stagg & Scott Ferretti
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